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mation and policy recommendations. The present paper derives a model of choice
allowing analysts to control for both presentation effects and stochastic errors in
econometric analyses. I test the model in a comprehensive re-analysis of dictator
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tal role of presentation for choice, and this notwithstanding the possibility of reliable
estimation and prediction.
JEL–Code: C10, C90
Keywords: discrete choice, presentation effects, utility estimation, counterfactual pre-
dictions, laboratory experiment
∗I thank Friedel Bolle, Annemarie Gronau, Matthias Lang, Nick Netzer, Martin Pollrich, Sebastian
Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Justin Valasek, Roel van Veldhuizen, Georg Weizsäcker and audiences in Berlin
(BERA workshop), Kreuzlingen (THEEM 2016), Heidelberg, and Schwanenwerder (CRC retreat) for many
helpful comments. Support of the DFG (BR 4648/1 and CRC TRR 190) is greatly appreciated. Address:
Spandauer Str. 1, 10099 Berlin, Germany, email: yves.breitmoser@hu-berlin.de, phone: +49 30 2093 99408.
1 Introduction
Economic studies analyze individual choice in order to understand preferences, amongst
others social, time and risk preferences. These analyses make for a large and important
literature, as understanding preferences is required as basis for theoretical analyses and
policy recommendations. Estimated preferences appear to be contradictory across studies,
however, which drastically limits their usefulness for making counterfactual predictions
and policy recommendations. This inconsistency is particularly prevalent in studies of
social preferences. As I show here, a major reason for this inconsistency appears to be
that presentation of options affects choice. Presentation matters due to default effects
(McKenzie et al., 2006; Dinner et al., 2011), left-digit effects (Poltrock and Schwartz,
1984; Lacetera et al., 2012), round-number effects (Heitjan and Rubin, 1991; Manski and
Molinari, 2010), and positioning effects (Dean, 1980; Miller and Krosnick, 1998; Feen-
berg et al., 2017). Absent a model of such presentation effects that would allow researchers
to control for them, they induce biased and inconsistent utility estimates. This implies the
perceived incompatibility of observations and may also be a major reason for the failure
to reach a consensus on (social) preference theories.
To fix ideas, consider an experimenter designing a dictator game experiment to test a
model of social preferences. In a dictator game, player 1 (“dictator”) chooses how many
tokens, x ∈ {0, . . . ,B}, to transfer to player 2 (“recipient”). Whatever model the exper-
imenter seeks to test, some theoretically irrelevant decisions have to be made to run the
experiment. I refer to them as presentation decisions. For example, the value of the cake to
be redistributed may be fixed and the experimenter has to set the total number of “slices” B
to run the experiment. By all received theories, the choice of B is theoretically irrelevant in
that the budget share transferred by player 1 is independent of B (aside from discreteness).
Yet, if B = 20, then the equal split results from a transfer of 10 tokens, and if say B = 25,
then the equal split is not attainable at all, let alone by choosing a round number.
Such presentation decisions have striking behavioral effects, as Figure 1 illustrates.
The figure revisits results from dictator game experiments that are behaviorally equivalent
in the sense that if behavior depends solely on preferences, and preferences are functions
of payoff profiles (as assumed in models of social and risk preferences), then the observed
choice patterns should be statistically indistinguishable. Yet, choice patterns depend sub-
stantially on the roundedness of the equal-split option (Figures 1a and 1b), patterns are en-
tirely different if choices are entered in graphical user interfaces (Figure 1c) and qualitative
results such as comparative statics are contradictory (see Figure 1d)—all of which results
in utility estimates that are inconsistent across studies (shown below). The implications
are substantial. Since comparative statics depend on presentation, experimental studies
cannot measure comparative statics (without controlling for presentation) and experimen-
tal results cannot be taken at face value. Since utilities are inconsistently estimated, social
preference models are not predictive, evaluating preference models by comparing results
from different experiments is futile, and convergence of social preference theory is put
out of reach. Such concerns regularly surface in critiques of experimental and behavioral
economics, and to address them, we need to control for presentation effects.
The present paper derives a model of presentation effects, applies it to standard data
sets (including those in Figure 1), and shows that it allows to effectively factor out and con-
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Figure 1: Choice in dictator games across experiments
(a) AM02 Treatment 4































(b) HJ06 Treatment 6
























































































Note: All data sets are introduced in detail in Section 3. The plots here show behavior in games where
each token is worth one point to the dictator and two points to the recipient. In Andreoni and Miller (2002,
AM02), the equal split is a round number (transferring 20 tokens), in Harrison and Johnson (2006, HJ06)
it is not a round number (transferring 33–34 tokens), and Fisman et al. (2007, FKM07) use a graphical
user interface that does not directly show the number of tokens redistributed. Further plots are provided as
supplement. Figure 1d shows the comparative statics of the budget share transferred by the dictator in the
transfer rate, ranging from 1/4 (highly taxed transfers) to 4/1 (highly subsidized transfers).
trol for presentation effects in analyses. These results are fairly positive in nature. While
behavior and social, time, and risk preferences appear to differ a lot across experiments,
this paper provides both an analytical framework and econometric evidence suggesting
that neither the preference theories nor experimental measurement as such are necessarily
inadequate. Instead, current measures are being confounded by presentation effects, which
we need to filter out, but doing so, we can get much further with our previous theories and
measures than we previously thought.
Section 2 provides a short and less technical overview of approach and results. Sec-
tion 3 contains the theoretical derivation and discussion of the focal choice adjusted logit
(Focal) model. Section 4 describes data sets and approach to the empirical analysis, test-
ing both adequacy and usefulness of the Focal model. Section 5 presents the econometric
results and Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains relegated proofs and definitions,
the online supplement contains reports on a number of robustness checks.
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2 Overview of approach and results
In order to formally capture presentation effects, let us assume that decision maker DM
seeks to maximize some utility function, but DM gets distracted by the presentation of the
choice task and is “tempted” to choose options that are particularly convenient or focal.
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) introduce a general model of set-based preferences, allow-
ing to capture the notion that DM’s evaluation of a set may be lower than her evaluation
of the best element in the set—choice as such is a non-trivial task and extraneous influ-
ences can obstruct finding and choosing the best option. These influences may stem from
presentation of options, from temptation of options, from computational or practical dif-
ficulties, and so on. Gul and Pesendorfer show that DM’s decision can be captured as
an attempt to maximize a sum ux + vx over the available options x ∈ B. The existence of
corresponding indices u and v follows from Gul and Pesendorfer’s axioms, ux captures the
utility associated with option x and vx captures the “obstruction” emanating from option
x. Considering the applications listed in this paper, I propose to interpret vx as the relative
focality of option x, which is a function of the presentation of options, and denote it as φx.
To apply this insight to experimental analyses, we need to extend Gul and Pesendor-
fer’s results to stochastic choice. The main challenge is that, given the range of conceiv-
able assumptions about locus and distribution of noise in the decision making process,
there are myriad ways of doing so, and the econometric results eventually will depend
on which assumptions we make (Hey, 2005; Wilcox, 2008). I address this challenge by
deriving a model of stochastic choice without restricting locus and distribution of noise.
Taking Gul and Pesendorfer’s main result, existence of distinct factors u and φ, as foun-
dation, I translate their result that DM maximizes ux +φx into four invariance statements
about choice and merely add the “positivity” axiom (all options have positive probabil-
ity) to inject stochastic choice. Note that positivity does not put a restriction on locus or
distribution of noise. The invariance statements are that choice satisfies independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA), that choice depends solely on u and φ, and that it is invariant
to translation of u and φ. These “axioms” represent ux + φx in the sense that they yield
ux +φx under rational choice, but they also allow for positivity.
Theorem 1 shows that, with positivity, the probability of choosing x ∈ B must satisfy
Pr(x|B) =
exp{λ ·ux +κ ·φx}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·ux′ +κ ·φx′}
, (1)
for some λ,κ ∈R. I call this model focal choice adjusted logit (Focal). The representation
is unique under a standard richness assumption and can be inverted (Theorem 2) to infer u
and φ up to affine transformation from observed choice probabilities. That is, u and φ are
distinguishable if they are not collinear, e.g. if they are functions of option attributes that
can be varied independently. In studies of social preferences, such independence follows
from the standard assumption that utility is a function of option payoffs and presentation
affects choice via payoff independent option attributes such as positioning and labeling.1
1In the above dictator game, varying the number of tokens B while holding the total value of all tokens
constant implies changes in the payoffs (and thus utilities) associated with options, without affecting the
“roundedness” of options (number of tokens transferred) as such. Similarly, subsidizing or taxing transfers
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Both results, Theorems 1 and 2, are surprising from an ex-ante perspective. Theorem
1 shows that structural models of stochastic choice can be defined without making func-
tional form assumptions on error distributions, which has been disputed by critiques of
structural work. For example, in response to such critiques, Rust (2014, p. 820) concedes
that “there is an identification problem that makes it impossible to decide between compet-
ing theories without imposing ad hoc auxiliary assumptions (such as parametric functional
form assumptions)”. Focal relies solely on positivity and four invariance statements, which
suffices thanks to a novel analytical approach via functional equations. Theorem 2 shows
that despite their linearly additive relationship, u and φ are both identified under a sim-
ple independence assumption satisfied by received models of social preferences. That is,
utility and relative focality are identified without assumptions restricting their functional
forms, which enables nonparametric studies of utility and stochastic choice. Finally, based
on Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Focal illustrates the applicability of this celebrated choice
model in econometric analyses and nests a number of specific thought-process models
allowing for “confounds” besides utility, most notably Mattsson and Weibull (2002) and
Matejka and McKay (2015). This suggests that Focal indeed provides an adequately gen-
eral characterization of choice in the presence of presentation effects.
In Sections 4 and 5, the Focal model is tested. The general idea underlying this test
is to determine whether Focal can be a useful model in applied work—on data sets as
they are typically analyzed under econometric assumptions as they are typically made.
The questions asked address the main concerns in applied work: Does Focal enable more
accurate counterfactual predictions than existing models? Does it provide consistent and
reliable estimates across studies? Do other models fail in this respect, and is the relevance
of presentation effects as substantial as suggested by Figure 1? This approach, testing
structural models by evaluating validity and consistency in-sample and out-of-sample us-
ing typical data sets and standard specification, follows Keane and Wolpin (2007) and
Keane (2010a,b).2 Other analyses of behavioral models evaluating out-of-sample predic-
tions include analyses of decision under risk (Harless and Camerer, 1994; Wilcox, 2008;
Hey et al., 2010), learning (Camerer and Ho, 1999), strategic choice in normal-form games
(Camerer et al., 2004), and social preferences (De Bruyn and Bolton, 2008).
Counterfactual predictions are required for policy recommendations and to form hy-
potheses for experimental studies. To predict, the analyst needs to factor out presentation
in the original context and to factor in presentation in the context to be predicted. Given
the (small) size of experimental data sets, this may well fail even if the choice model is
sound. Consistency of estimates requires analysts to control for presentation effects in ex-
perimental work, which necessitates additional information and thus may well fail given
current experimental designs. Finally, Focal may be of significant help in applied work,
changes payoffs and utilities without affecting roundedness of options.
2Implicitly, I test the model in its entirety and ask whether it does what it is supposed to do in the context
where it is supposed to be applied. An alternative approach is to test the axioms or assumptions in isolation,
one-by-one in dedicated, context-free experiments. This approach is possible here as much as it is possible
with other models, but it is somewhat inadequate in the present analysis. My basic premises are that behavior
is presentation dependent in experiments designed by analysts. Hence, the results of dedicated analyses of
axioms in isolated, artificial contexts are not informative. A case in point are tests of IIA, as discussed in
Section 3.2. Briefly, it is straightforward to falsify IIA, by duplicating options, but this is not a concern in
experimental studies, as experiments are designed by researchers diligently avoiding duplicate options.
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using “significant” in its statistical sense, without being of economic relevance. In this
case, Focal might not be worth the additional effort required, albeit small.
The plots in Figure 1 may help putting such concerns into context. The presentation
effects are drastic, recall Figures 1a and 1c for example. They are also economically highly
relevant as they affect the level of transfers and the sign of comparative statics. Perhaps
most strikingly, while taxation and subsidization of transfers may well prove irrelevant,
as in HJ06 and FKM07, changing the presentation can increase transfers by 50%, from
20% of endowments (FKM07) to 30% of endowments (HJ06). Considering this scale
of the phenomena related to presentation, it reasonable to hypothesize that addressing
presentation is highly important already in typically sized and structured experiments.
The econometric results of re-analyzing dictator experiments strongly corroborate
this hypothesis. In sample, Focal explains around 85% of observed variance across dicta-
tor experiments (in terms of the pseudo-R2), while benchmark models such as logit explain
around 60% of observed variance. Out-of-sample, i.e. making counterfactual predictions,
Focal captures around 80% of observed variance, while benchmark models capture around
40%. Thus, Focal’s predictions are much more accurate, and in this respect Focal marks
an improvement of substantial proportion. Next, the difference between Focal’s numbers,
85% and 80%, is insignificant, showing that Focal’s estimates are indeed consistent across
data sets and that its predictions (almost) have in-sample accuracy. In turn, the differences
for the benchmark models, roughly 60% in-sample to 40% out-of-sample, are highly sig-
nificant and show that existing models yield significantly inconsistent estimates.
Finally, to analyze relevance, I relate the improvement in model adequacy gained by
controlling for presentation (using Focal) to the adequacy gained by controlling for subject
heterogeneity. The baseline model is the representative agent logit model, controlling for
neither heterogeneity nor presentation. Its premise is that the average degree of altruism
in a population is informative, which captures about 20% of observed variance in-sample
and about −5% out-of-sample (i.e. “minus five per cent”, it predicts worse than a model
predicting uniform randomization)—its predictions are slightly worse than useless and the
existence of a representative agent has to be rejected. In relation to this baseline, control-
ling for heterogeneity improves adequacy by around 40 percentage points, both in-sample
and out-of-sample. Controlling for presentation adds another 30 percentage points in-
sample and 40 percentage points out-of-sample. That is, controlling for presentation is
orthogonal to and of the same importance as controlling for heterogeneity—in typical ex-
perimental data sets. Hence, experimental studies need to control for both, heterogeneity
and presentation. There is no reason for doing one without the other, and future experi-
mental designs can facilitate controlling for presentation, similarly to the efforts made to
control for heterogeneity in current designs and analyses. These and related implications
are discussed in the concluding Section 6.
3 Focal choice adjusted logit
Decision maker DM chooses an option x ∈ B from a finite budget set B ⊂ X . Based on
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), we allow DM’s decision to be a function of utility u : X →R
and focality φ : X → R of options. Utility ux represents the utility that DM derives from
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option x ∈ X (“commitment ranking” in the words of Gul and Pesendorfer), and focality φx
represents a secondary choice factor induced by the presentation of options (“temptation
ranking” in Gul and Pesendorfer). The pair (u,φ) is called “context” of DM’s choice task.
The set of contexts (u,φ) is denoted as C , and the set of possible budgets B is the set of
finite subsets of X , denoted as P(X). Given context (u,φ) ∈ C , the probability that DM
chooses x ∈ B from budget B ∈ P(X) is denoted as Pr(x|u,φ,B).
One may think of u as a function of option payoffs and φ as a function of option labels
or positioning, which in principle are independent of another and could be conditioned on
directly—at the cost of maintaining otherwise unnecessary notation. Conditioning on the
unknown (u,φ) in Pr(x|u,φ,B) is a notational shortcut, but it does not assume that u or
φ are known or directly observable. To the contrary, the objective is to infer u and φ
from choice, and to this purpose, we first analyze how to represent choice probabilities in
terms of u and φ (Section 3.1) and then invert the system to show that both u and φ are
identified up to affine transformation based on simple experiments (Section 3.3). Section
3.2 discusses assumptions and axioms underlying the representation result.
3.1 Representation
Assumption 1 characterizes the analytical framework. First, for any given context (u,φ)
available to an experimenter, all affine transformations of this context (i.e. of u and φ) are
equally possible—which will allow me to show that affine transformations actually are
indistinguishable for the experimenter in the sense that u and φ are identified only up to
affine transformation.3 In addition, this assumption ensures that u and φ can be varied
independently, which is required for identification. Second, I exclude the trivial cases
that utility and focality are collinear and that choice probabilities are constant. Third, and
this guarantees uniqueness, the set of possible options X as well as the images of u and
φ are convex subsets of R. Convexity of X obtains in standard examples, as say lottery
probabilities and dictator transfers can be varied continuously although DM’s option set is
a finite set B ⊂ X constructed by the experimenter. Convexity of the images then follows
from standard continuity assumptions. Similar richness assumptions are made in most
studies analyzing foundations of choice, see e.g. Gul et al. (2014) and Fudenberg et al.
(2015) for examples in the context of stochastic choice.
Assumption 1. For any (u,φ) ∈ C , using u[X ] = {ux|x ∈ X} and φ[X ] = {φx|x ∈ X},
1. Choice tasks: (au +bu ·u,aφ +bφ ·φ) ∈ C for all (au,bu),(aφ,bφ) ∈ R2.
2. Non-triviality: The functions u and φ are not collinear, and there exist x,x′ ∈ B ∈
P(X) such that Pr(x|u,φ,B) 6= Pr(x′|u,φ,B).
3. Convexity: X ,u[X ],φ[X ] are convex, non-singleton subsets of R.
3With slight abuse of notation, I will identify all real numbers as constant functions such that addition and
multiplication of a function with a real are well-defined. Thus, for any u : X →R and any a,b∈R, u′ = a+bu
is equivalent to u′x = a+ bux for all x ∈ X . Note also that I allow for negative affine transformations (i.e.
b < 0). For, based on choice data alone, we are not able to distinguish a DM maximizing utility from a DM
minimizing utility without assuming monotonicity. Thus, without monotonicity, utility and focality are not
identified up to positive affine transformation. See Benkert and Netzer (2015) for further discussion.
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Choice is assumed to comply with five axioms: positivity, IIA, invariance to trans-
lation of utility u and focality φ, and equality of utility and focality between two options
implies equality of relative choice probabilities (in relation to third options). The latter
implies that u and φ are the only systematic factors of choice. A related but stronger as-
sumption is to require that choice probabilities are weakly monotone in utility and focality.
This implies “completeness” but not vice versa. Weak monotonicity is not required.
Behavioral axioms For all (u,φ) ∈ C , all B ∈ P(X), all x ∈ B and all r ∈ R,
1. Positivity: Pr(x|u,φ,B)> 0,





3. Narrow bracketing: Pr(x|u,φ,B) = Pr(x|u+ r,φ,B),
4. Relative focality: Pr(x|u,φ,B) = Pr(x|u,φ+ r,B),














These assumptions uniquely pin down the functional form of choice probabilities and
imply that choice probabilities have a focal choice adjusted logit (Focal) representation.
The detailed discussion follows the presentation of the formal result.
Definition 1 (Focal choice adjusted logit (Focal)). DM’s choice profile Pr has a Focal
representation if there exist λ,κ ∈ R such that
Pr(x|u,φ,B) =
exp{λ ·ux +κ ·φx}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·ux′ +κ ·φx′}
for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X) and (u,φ) ∈ C . (2)
Theorem 1. Given Assumption 1, the following two statements are equivalent.
1. Choice profile Pr satisfies Axioms 1–5
2. Choice profile Pr has a Focal representation and (λ,κ) ∈ R2 are unique
Intuition Positivity and IIA imply that choice probabilities are functions of “choice
propensities” (Luce, 1959). Without further information, the choice propensity of x ∈ X
is defined only in relation to a benchmark option y ∈ X (McFadden, 1974), and as IIA





with V (x,y |u,φ) = fu,φ(ux,uy,φx,φy,x,y).
Any y ∈ X may serve as benchmark option, and by convexity of X , the reference to the
benchmark can be dropped, i.e. V (x,y |u,φ) = f̃u,φ(ux,φx,x) for some function f̃ . By
Axiom 5, completeness, options that are equivalent in terms of both utility and focality
have equal choice propensities in any choice task, implying that choice propensities can
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be represented independently of x. Formally, a family of functions Ṽu,φ exists such that
Ṽu,φ(ux,φx) = f̃u,φ(ux,φx,x) for all x ∈ X , and all contexts (u,φ). Given this characteriza-




Ṽu+ru,φ+rφ(ux + ru,φx + rφ)
Ṽu+ru,φ+rφ(ux′ + ru,φx′ + rφ)
for all x,x′ ∈ X and ru,rφ ∈ R, (3)
which in turn implies Ṽu+ru,φ+rφ(ux + ru,φx + rφ) = Ṽu,φ(ux,φx) · g(ru,rφ) for some func-
tion g. Due to the context dependence of Ṽ , Ṽu+ru,φ+rφ 6= Ṽu,φ is possible, but “complete-
ness” restricts context dependence by allowing the functional equation to be expressed as
h(ux + ru,φx + rφ) = h(ux,φx) · g(ru,rφ) for some function h : R2 → R. The main tech-
nical difficulty is that h is not necessarily differentiable.4 By positivity, the logarithmic
transformation h̃ = logh and g̃ = logg is admissible, which yields the Pexider functional
equation h̃(ux + ru,φx + rφ) = h̃(ux,φx)+ g̃(ru,rφ), and by their relation to probabilities,
h̃ is bounded from above for all values in the images of u and φ (in any context),5 which
each have positive length by “convexity” (Assumption 1). This implies that all solutions
of h̃ are linear in ux and φx, and the non-collinearity of u and φ implies that the respec-
tive coefficients (λ,κ) are unique. Thus, h̃(ux,φx) = λux +κφx + cx for all x, with unique
λ,κ ∈ R and c : X → R (Aczél and Dhombres, 1989). Using Ṽu,φ = exp h̃,
Pr(x|u,φ,B) =
exp{λ ·ux +κ ·φx + cx}
∑x′∈B exp{λ ·ux′ +κ ·φx′ + cx′}
. (4)
Completeness implies that cx is constant in x and cancels out, yielding the Focal represen-
tation. The detailed proof is relegated to the appendix.
3.2 Discussion
Foundation for u and φ Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) introduce the notion of set-based
preferences to capture decision makers experiencing temptation and exerting self-control.
The basic model is general, essentially capturing a DM experiencing arbitrary “costs”
when having to choose between options. These costs could be due to temptation, as in Gul
and Pesendorfer’s leading example, due to the relative focality of options as a result of
their presentation, as in the examples considered here, or due to mechanical or computa-
tional difficulties in implementing or evaluating options, as in the thought-process models
discussed below. Gul and Pesendorfer’s model encompasses this range of applications
thanks to its general formulation, extending the standard framework of a DM with prefer-
ences over outcomes “simply” by allowing that DM’s evaluation of a set of options differs
from the evaluation of the best option in the set. This difference reflects the costs of choos-
ing from the respective set of options, it depends on the available alternatives, and may
4For purpose of illustration, consider the simple case that propensities Ṽ are context independent, dif-
ferentiable in ux and independent of φx. Then we obtain Ṽ (u+ r) = Ṽ (u) · g(r) and after differentiating
with respect to r, at r = 0 we obtain Ṽ ′(u) = Ṽ (u) · g′(0). The solution of this differential equation is
Ṽ (u) = exp{λu+ c} with λ = g′(0) and c ∈ R.
5Briefly, the choice probabilities Pr(x|u,φ,B) are bounded from above at 1, the propensities Ṽ (ux,φx) are
therefore bounded from above at some positive real number, finally so are log-propensities f̃ = logṼ .
9
result from temptation, focality, or any other distraction. Gul and Pesendorfer additionally
assume that the evaluation of a set is not worse than the evaluation of the worst option in
this set, which in conjunction with completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence
implies that functions u,v : X → R exist such that DM’s choice can be represented as one
maximizing ux + vx in stage 2 of their model (when facing “temptation”). This result is
the foundation of the model proposed here, with the notational adaptation that we focus
on relative focality φ in light of the applications we have in mind.
Normative appeal of the axioms If DM maximizes ux + vx across available options,
or ux +φx in our notation, then choice satisfies IIA, is invariant to translation of u and φ,
and behavior is described “completely” by u and φ (in the sense of Axiom 5). In turn,
if choice satisfies these axioms, then it can be represented as maximization of ux + φx.
To be precise, if u,φ : X → R are exogenously given, then these axioms imply that DM
maximizes αux + βφx for some α,β ∈ R, which reflects that u,φ are identified only up
to affine transformation. That is, Axioms 2–5 are, aside from the fact that they allow for
stochastic choice, equivalent to Gul and Pesendorfer’s representation of choice in “stage
2” of their model, and in this sense, the axioms used here use Gul and Pesendorfer’s result
as foundation, represent them as invariance statements about choice probabilities (Axioms
2–5) and add positivity (Axiom 1) to inject stochastic choice. From this perspective, the
axioms are normatively adequate given the results of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).
Nature and testability of Axioms 3 and 4 Axioms 3 and 4 relate the observable choice
profile Pr to unobservable entities u and φ. This is standard practice in modeling stochastic
choice (though usually less explicit), as any model of stochastic choice links Pr and u based
on some explicit or implicit assumption. To clarify, the existing literature distinguishes two
approaches toward axiomatic foundations of logit and generalizations thereof. The first
approach may be called unconditional logit and follows Luce (1959). Basically, positivity




for some function u : X → R. Function u can be intuitively interpreted as stimulus or




for some function ũ : X →R. If one assumes that either u or ũ represents utility up to affine
transformation, one implicitly assumes that either of these functional forms is adequate
and thus makes an assumption linking choice probabilities and (unobservable) utility.
The second approach is called conditional logit and follows McFadden (1974). Ax-
iom 3 of McFadden explicitly links choice probabilities and unobservable utility, and in
addition, it is equivalent to assuming that binomial choice is binomial logit (Breitmoser,
2016). Furthermore, both conditional and unconditional logit characterizations make spe-
cific functional form assumptions while relating probabilities and utilities, functional form
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assumptions that are not behaviorally founded and frequently criticized for this reason (for
discussion, see Rust, 2014). In contrast, the narrow bracketing axiom used here is a sub-
stantially weaker invariance assumption and implied by Gul and Pesendorfer’s results—
which resolves the canonical critique of structural models.
Regarding testability, since all econometrically applicable models of stochastic choice
require assumptions or axioms linking choice probabilities and (unknown) utilities, di-
rect tests by manipulating utilities are difficult to conceive, in all cases. Indirect tests are
straightforward, however. For example, based on the identification result provided below,
logarithmized choice probabilities are affine functions of utilities and focalities, which can
be used to test via regression if the linear functional form indeed provides a good fit. If not,
translation invariance with respect to utility or focality is violated. Alternatively, we can
test if the model as a whole allows to capture and predict behavior.6 This approach allows
to detect inadequate assumptions by relating the model’s adequacy to other models based
on weaker assumptions, and it allows to evaluate model adequacy in domains of empirical
relevance. Since behavior may be domain specific, this approach makes for a particularly
informative test of models from the perspective of applied work and is adopted here.
Relation to thought-process models A number of studies analyze models of the thought
process underlying choice and then derive conditions for this process to generate say logit
choice. The perhaps best-known such model is the random utility model (Thurstone, 1927)
where the utilities of all options are randomly perturbed prior to DM’s choice. Logit
obtains if the utility perturbation have extreme value type 1 distribution (McFadden, 1974).
Mattsson and Weibull (2002) consider a DM facing costs implementing specific options
with certainty, say bowling a strike. A rational DM trades off precision and costs, therefore
ends up choosing stochastically, and under certain assumptions on the cost function, choice




The additional term wx reflects the prior choice probabilities, a default choice pattern re-
sulting if DM does not attempt to exert any control. Matejka and McKay (2015) obtain
the same generalized logit model assuming DM has to spend time to study the utilities as-
sociated with the available options and is “rationally inattentive”. Again, DM maximizes
expected utility of the choice less the costs of studying utilities, and if costs relate to the
Shannon entropy, the above generalized logit model results, again with wx representing
the prior choice probabilities that obtain if DM does not study utility at all.
Both of these models fit the Gul-Pesendorfer framework, most notably set-between-
ness, and thus are contained as special cases. As a result, they also are contained as special
cases in Focal, which shows as Focal allows for an additional free parameter κ. This
6For example, Keane (2010b, p. 15) argues that the usefulness of structural models be determined resting
on two questions: “(1) Does the model do a reasonable job of fitting important dimensions of the historical
data on which it was fit? (2) Does the model do a reasonable job at out-of-sample prediction – especially
when used to predict the impact of policy changes that alter the economic environment in some fundamental
way from that which generated the data used in estimation?” Instead of policy changes, I consider changes
in the way the choice tasks are presented to experimental subjects.
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generalization reflects that Focal avoids specific assumption about the thought process and
cost functions or entropies, but considering that avoiding these assumptions merely costs
an additional parameter suggests that Focal’s representation result is surprisingly tight.
Positive appeal of the axioms Positivity implies that choice is stochastic, i.e. that DM
does not manage to consistently maximize utility. This assumption is a widely adopted,
parsimonious explanation for inconsistencies observed in behavioral analyses, as discussed
by Hey (1995) and Wilcox (2008) in detail.7 McFadden (1974) also notes that positivity
is empirically indistinguishable from rational choice, as the probabilities may be arbitrar-
ily close to zero, and relatedly, all structural analyses (including least squares) allow for
stochastic choice and assume positivity.
IIA assumes that choice does not exhibit similarity effects, the limitation of which
was first clarified by Debreu (1960)’s red-bus/blue-bus example. The Focal model can be
generalized straightforwardly when similarity effects are present, but arguably such gener-
alizations are not necessary in utility and demand estimation. In general, similarity effects
can be captured by nested logit, a random utility model with perturbations following a
generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution. Focal also is a random utility model and









ux′ + κ̃ ·φx′
)
}
for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X).
Hence, Focal admits GEV perturbations and thus nested (focal choice adjusted) logit.
Nested logit models are used in transportation research, but rarely in empirical IO and to
my knowledge never in experimental analyses. The reasons appear to be that demand func-
tions explicitly capture similarity effects (Nevo, 2000) and that laboratory experiments are
generally designed to avoid similar (redundant) options for clarity (Davis and Holt, 1993).
Least squares analyses also obey IIA. Thus, in the context of utility and demand estima-
tion, IIA is not considered “problematic” in existing work, but as indicated, generalizations
are possible and I will consider a model relaxing IIA as a benchmark below.
Narrow bracketing in general refers to the phenomenon that “background utility” is
behaviorally irrelevant (Read et al., 1999). Under rational choice, this obtains if DM’s
utility is the sum of “decision utility” from the task being analyzed and “background util-
ity” from experiences outside of this task, including earlier tasks in the experiment. Such
invariance with respect to variation in background utility is generally assumed in behav-
ioral analyses, including least squares analyses, in the sense that background utility is not
modeled or analyzed (Harrison et al., 2007). It is consistent with the robust finding that
behavior in experiments is independent of socio-economic background variables such as
income or wealth (Gächter et al., 2004; Bellemare et al., 2008, 2011).
Relative focality requires that choice is invariant to translating focality. As illustra-
tion, consider the choice of an integer and assume that multiples of 100 have focality 2,
7Experimental subjects act “inconsistently” in the sense that they choose dominated options (Birnbaum
and Navarrete, 1998; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001), violate revealed preference (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fis-
man et al., 2007), and choose inconsistently even after controlling for wealth and portfolio effects (Camerer,
1989; Starmer and Sugden, 1991).
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other multiples of 10 have focality 1, and other integers have focality 0. Here, plain in-
tegers are assumed to have the base level of focality (zero), but it appears to be equally
plausible to state that multiples of 10 have the basic “zero” focality or the multiples of 100,
provided all other focalities are translated accordingly. This intuition holds if “relative fo-
cality” is relevant, i.e. the differences in focalities between options and not their absolute
values. Axiom 4 reflects this intuition, and the results below suggests that it is adequate in
the sense that choice patterns will turn out predictable across very different option sets.8
Finally, “completeness” implies that utility and focality are the only systematic factors
of choice, reflecting the scope of the present analysis and model.
3.3 Identification
The representation result derives the choice profile Pr if utility and focality are given and
implies that utility and focality are additively separated—suggesting they may be indis-
tinguishable. The following result shows that u and φ are identified without additional
assumptions from choice probabilities observed in adequate experiments.
Theorem 2. Fix (u,φ) ∈ C , and assume Pr has a Focal representation, i.e. Axioms 1–5
and Assumption 1. The choice utility vx := logPr(x|u,φ,X), for all x ∈ X, satisfies
vx = a+λ ux +κ φx (5)
with (λ,κ) as in the Focal representation and a = infx vx − infx(λux +κφx). This implies
that, for any B ⊂ X, observations from two (adequate) choice tasks suffice to identify both,
u : B → R and φ : B → R, up to affine transformation.
For intuition, assume that utility is a mapping from option payoffs to the reals, while
focality is a mapping from option labels to the reals. When we permute option payoffs
without changing option labels, Eq. (5) implies that identification of u and φ requires ob-
servations from only two choice tasks and is possible without functional form assumptions
(i.e. non-parametrically). This is shown constructively, in order to clarify that there are no
fundamental limitations to identification implied by Focal. Let me note, however, that
the nonparametric approach may be inefficient if the analyst has prior knowledge about
say utility functions, seeks to test utility theories, or wishes to estimate say a degree of
altruism, to pool observations from different games (which requires a general notation of
utility), or to predict counterfactuals.
Task 1 implements a payoff function π : B →Rn on the budget set B = {0, . . . ,10}; let
x = 0 and x = 10. Task 2 maintains budget set and option labels, but permutes the mapping
from options to payoffs, for example by rotation toward π̃ : B → Rn as in
π̃(x) = π(x−1) for all x > x and π̃(x) = π(x).
8I am not aware of explicit evidence, but relativity of focality can be tested straightforwardly. If DM first
has to choose an integer between 1 and 30, and secondly a multiple of 10 between 10 and 300, reassigning
utilities appropriately, relativity predicts that the respective choice patterns should be equal.
13
Since utility is a mapping from option payoffs to the reals, this implies ũx = ux−1 and
ũx = ux. Let Pr ∈ ∆(X) and P̃r ∈ ∆(X) denote the choice probabilities in the two tasks. By
Theorem 2, logPr(x) = a+λux +κφx and logP̃r(x) = ã+λũx +κφx, implying
logP̃r(x)− logPr(x−1) = ã−a+κφx −κφx−1 ∀x > x, and
logP̃r(x)− logPr(x) = ã−a+κφx −κφx,
with ã− a constant. Letting φx = 0, focality φ : B → R is thus identified up to affine
transformation.9 Given this, and using a+λux = logPr(x)−κφx, u : B →R is also defined
up to affine transformation. Lemma 1 in the appendix establishes this result formally, and
Theorem 2 ensures that the estimates are approximately consistent.
A few more points may be worth noting about identification. First, the identification
u and φ is entirely nonparametric, i.e. their separation is achieved without making iden-
tifying assumptions or assuming specific functional forms to structure noise, utility, or
presentation effects (focality). Second, rotation of the payoff function ensures identifica-
tion up to affine transformation using observations from two tasks, but adding further tasks
does not refine identification beyond affine transformation (obviously, extending sample
size improves finite sample properties). Third, rotation is far from being the only scheme
enabling identification, but not every permutation of options does. The best-known in-
adequate permutation is the reversion of option lists in order to nullify ordering effects.
This approach would be adequate if we knew that focality is linear in list positioning, but
evidence suggests that focality tends to be nonlinear and potentially u-shaped (see also
Rubinstein and Salant, 2006, and Feenberg et al., 2017). For example, if both first and
last option have high focality and all other options have low focality, then reversion has no
effect. Acknowledging this, an equation system similar to above has to be solved for iden-
tification, but the equation system resulting from order reversion is generally dependent,
implying that identification by reversion is impossible (see Lemma 2 in the appendix).
Finally, utility can be estimated also semi-parametrically, by determining κφx non-
parametrically (as above) and regressing the resulting “raw utilities” a+λux = logPr(x)−
κφx on payoff profiles, or parametrically by adopting functional forms of both u and
φ. Their parameters as well as λ and κ can be estimated by (non-linear) regression of
choice utility v on payoffs and labels under the standard identification requirements. The
main requirement is that log-propensities at the true parameters are not translations of log-
propensities at alternative parameter vectors (see e.g. Greene, 2003). This is satisfied if
both utility and focality are choice relevant (λ,κ > 0), no two parameterizations of u (or
φ) are affine transformations of one another, and utility and focality at the true parameters
are not collinear. These conditions are reasonable and can be checked straightforwardly.
Since the additive constant a and the scaling factors λ,κ are free parameters, identifica-
tion of u and φ is again unique up to affine transformation. I will estimate parameters by
maximum likelihood, which are identified under the same conditions as regression.
9The preceding set of equations is a system of x− x+ 1 = 11 linear equations with 11 unknowns: all
κφx with x > x and a constant c := ã− a. Since κ and φx are not separately identified and φx = 0 was set,
identification is unique up to affine transformation. Lemma 1 in the appendix provides the details.
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Table 1: The data sets
#Treatments #Options #Observations Transfer ratios
“Manual” dictator games
AM02 (Andreoni and Miller, 2002) 8 41–101 176×8 3 : 1,. . . ,1 : 3
HJ06 (Harrison and Johnson, 2006) 10 41–101 57×10 1 : 1,. . . ,1 : 4
CHST07 (Cappelen et al., 2007) 6 401–1601 96×2 1:1
“Graphical” dictator games
FKM07 (Fisman et al., 2007) 50 500–1000 76×50 4 : 1,. . . ,1 : 3
4 Testing Focal: Data and general approach
The purpose of the econometric test is to apply the model in conditions typical for applied
work, i.e. on standard data sets making standard assumptions. This section explains why
dictator experiments are selected for this purpose and states the typical assumptions on
utility, subject heterogeneity, and focality in this context, where the latter is borrowed
from the statistics literature on round-number effects in survey responses.
The selected data sets are from experiments on dictator games. Dictator games enable
an analysis of utility and focality in a context where utility and focality individually appear
to be understood and additional factors can be ruled out. Specifically, there is consensus
that utilities u are adequately captured by CES functions, there are unambiguous presen-
tation effects (round-number effects), and the choice task does not involve confounds due
to e.g. risk, probability weighting, or (strategic) uncertainty. There does not seem to be
a better-suited class of experiments for our purpose. Further, there exist four well-known
experimental analyses designed to estimate utility functions and differing only in presenta-
tional aspects, which appears to be uniquely true for dictator games. The four experiments
elicit multiple choices per subject, which allows to disentangle utility and noise, but oth-
erwise they are representative for hundreds of small-scale dictator experiments (Engel,
2011). Finally, one of these experiments (Fisman et al., 2007) avoids presentation effects
due to round numbers by using a graphical user interface, which provides “counterfactual”
information when analyzing consistency and reliability of estimates across studies.
Definition 2 (Generalized dictator game). DM chooses an option x ∈ {0,1, . . . ,B}. Given
x, the dictator’s payoff is π1(x) = τ1 · (B− x) and the recipient’s payoff is π2 = τ2 · x.
Table 1 provides an overview of the data sets and Figure 1 above provides selected
histograms of observed choices (the supplement provides all histograms). In conjunction,
these studies provide a fairly comprehensive picture of dictator choice. Fisman et al. (2007,
FKM07) use the graphical user interface preventing round-number effects, while the other
studies elicit choices manually, implying round-number patterns. Cappelen et al. (2007,
CHST07) allow for budgets up to B = 1600, and subjects primarily choose multiples of
100, Andreoni and Miller (2002, AM02) and Harrison and Johnson (2006, HJ06) allow
for budgets up to B = 100 and choices mainly are multiples of 10. In AM02, the Leontief
(payoff-equalizing) choice is generally a multiple of 10 or 25, but in HJ06, it is often a
plain integer. The latter drastically affects the relative frequency of the Leontief choice,
showing that the Leontief choice is frequent if and only if it is a round number.
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Table 2: Distribution of choices across “round” numbers
Percentage of choices with greatest factor . . .
Experiment 0 1000 500 250 100 50 25 10 5 2.5 1 0.5 0.1
AM02 39 1 9 7 33 6 0 4
HJ06 22 3 4 7 39 14 0 10
FKM07 25 0 0 0 0 2 1 4 5 63
CHST07 30 0 5 1 62 1 0 0 0 0 0
Note: For each experiment, these percentages are pooled (and averaged) across treatments. The numbers do
not always add up to exactly 100 due to rounding errors.
Table 3: Level of focality depending on the “roundedness” of option x
Greatest factor of x 1000 500 100 50 10 5 1 0.5 0.1
Level of focality φx 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2
Note: For example, the option to transfer x = 60 tokens has the greatest factor 10 in the above list and hence
focality φx = 2. In addition, φ0 := 2. The base level of “zero focality” can be shifted arbitrarily.
Utility Following Andreoni and Miller (2002), most dictator game analyses estimate
utility functions exhibiting constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between dictator in-








Here, α represents the degree of altruism and β represents the degree of efficiency con-
cerns. Subjects are efficiency concerned with β = 1 and equity concerned as β →−∞.
Focality Table 2 reviews the numbers chosen in these experiments. In the experiments
with manual choice, subjects rarely choose plain integers. Mostly, they choose multiples
of 10 and 100, as described above. In addition, subjects tend to choose multiples of 5 and
50 reasonably regularly, while multiples of 2.5 and 25 are chosen a little less frequently.
These choice patterns correspond with the observations made in survey analyses, which
consistently find that 100,50,10,5,1,0.5,0.1, ... exhibit decreasing levels of roundedness
(Battistin et al., 2003; Whynes et al., 2005; Covey and Smith, 2006). For these reasons, let
me define the (degree of) focality of a number x as the level of the highest number in this
sequence that divides x. The focality level of multiples of 100 is 4, other multiples of 50
have level 3, and so on; as defined in Table 3. Clearly, this notion of focality levels merely
reflects the current understanding and leaves room for improvement in future work.10
Specification Adopting standard practice, all parameters (α,β,λ,κ) are heterogeneous
across subjects in the sense that they differ randomly between subjects: α is truncated nor-
10Note that the distinction of discrete focality levels does not violate convexity of the image φ[X ] assumed
above, Assumption 1. The discrete focality function used here is defined for all multiples of 0.1 and can be
extended straightforwardly to a continuous function on R obeying convexity of the image.
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mal on [−0.5,0.5], β is normal, λ and κ are log-normal.11 This mixed-logit model and the
distributional assumptions are standard, see e.g. Bellemare et al. (2008), Wilcox (2008),
and Train (2003).12 Appendix A provides all details. Likelihoods are computed by numer-
ical integration using quasi-random numbers (Train, 2003) and maximized in a three-step
approach, using first a robust gradient-free approach (NEWUOA, Powell, 2006), secondly
a Newton-Raphson method to ensure convergence, and finally extensive cross-testing of
estimates across data sets and models to ensure that global maxima are found. Models are
evaluated using the likelihood ratio test of Schennach and Wilhelm (2016) which is robust
to both misspecification and arbitrary nesting of models. I will indicate significance of dif-
ferences between models distinguishing the conventional level of 0.05 and the higher level
of 0.005. The latter roughly implements the Bonferroni correction given the simultaneous
tests of four models on four data sets, which I will focus on.
5 Results
First I analyze basic model adequacy, i.e. in-sample fit. The practically more relevant ques-
tions on counterfactual predictions, consistency of estimates and relevance are answered
subsequently. Throughout, I relate the results for Focal to those of three key benchmark
models. Besides the obvious benchmark “multinomial logit”, which is the model used
in most current analyses of discrete choice and hence must be considered, I consider a
nested logit model allowing for similarity effects between proximate options (Ordered
GEV, Small, 1987), to test for violation of IIA, and a model of limited attention following
Echenique et al. (2014), which provides an alternative explanation for the focus on round
numbers. The formal definitions of these models are provided in the appendix.
5.1 Capturing behavior
Table 4 summarizes the results on descriptive adequacy evaluated in terms of the Bayes
information criterion (BIC) and the pseudo-R2. The former quantifies model adequacy
adjusting for the number of parameters used, the latter clarifies how much of the observed
variance is explained in relation to the benchmarks clairvoyance and naiveté.13 The rela-
tion signs indicate significance of differences, as defined in the table note. Table 4 pools the
11Further, the “payoffs” in the CES utility function are the experimental tokens earned by the subjects. The
supplement provides extensive robustness checks for both assumptions. Allowing for subject heterogeneity
in all dimensions allows for slightly more robust fit for all models, without obstructing identification. The
token-based utility function used here fits best assuming the status quo model logit. The main alternative
to the latter assumption is contextual utility (Wilcox, 2011), which tends to fit best for Focal and PALM,
but these tendencies are overall minor and therefore not discussed here. The main results are fully robust to
variations in these assumptions, as shown in the supplement.
12More generally, mixed logit models are standard in analyses of consumer demand, Berry et al. (1995),
and in analyses of social preferences (Cappelen et al., 2007; Bellemare et al., 2008) as well as risk prefer-
ences (Harrison et al., 2007; Andersen et al., 2008).
13“Clairvoyance” predicts the choice distributions as they have been observed and “naiveté” predicts
uniform randomization. Given a model’s log-likelihood ll, BIC = |ll|+ log(#obs) ·#par/2 (Schwarz, 1978)
and given the log-likelihoods of the “clairvoyant” model and the naive model, denoted as llmax and llmin
respectively, the pseudo-R2 is defined as R2 = (BIC− llmin)/(llmax − llmin) (Nagelkerke, 1991).
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Table 4: Precision of the choice models in-sample (BIC: less is better; R2: more is better)
Limited
Value range Focality Similarity Attention IIA
Clairvoyance Naiveté (Focal) (OGEV) (PALM) (Logit)
Large manual DG experiments (AM02, HJ06; 8 and 10 observations per subject)
BIC 2812.1 8137 3371.9 ≪ 4420.9 ≈ 4492.6 ≪ 4690.3
R2 1 0 0.895 ≫ 0.698 ≈ 0.684 ≫ 0.647
Small manual DG experiment (CHST07; 2 observations per subject)
BIC 260.8 1271.4 430.4 ≪ 920 ≈ 910.5 ≈ 931.1
R2 1 0 0.832 ≫ 0.348 ≈ 0.357 ≈ 0.337
Graphical DG experiment (FKM07, 50 observations per subject)
BIC 10021.8 23249.2 15103.9 ≈ 15087.7 ≈ 15119.4 ≈ 15123.9
R2 1 0 0.616 ≈ 0.617 ≈ 0.615 ≈ 0.614
Content: For each choice model (Logit, OGEV, PALM, and Focal), the descriptive accuracy (BIC and
pseudo-R2 in-sample) is reported for data from the three groups of experiments. Significance of differences
is evaluated by the robust Schennach and Wilhelm (2016) LR test: ≈ indicates p-values above 0.05, >,<
indicate p-values between 0.005 and 0.05, and ≫,≪ indicate p-values below 0.005.
results for AM02 and HJ06 due to their similarity, both entailing choice from up to B= 100
options with 8 or 10 observations per subject. This way, Table 4 presents the results by
type of data set: manual choice with many observations per subject (“large manual”), with
few observations per subject (“small manual”), and graphical choice (“graphical”).
Table 4 shows that there are no substantial differences between models in the graph-
ical DG but large differences in the manual DGs. This will be of relevance for utility
estimation. Specifically, in the “large manual” experiments AM02 and HJ06, Focal cap-
tures 89% of observed variance, logit explains around 65% of variance, and PALM and
OGEV improve slightly but statistically significantly on logit, explaining around 69% of
observed variance. In the “small manual” experiment (CHST07), Focal’s adequacy is sim-
ilar, at 83%, but the benchmark models all drop to around 35% in terms of the pseudo-R2.
In the graphical experiment, finally, all models explain around 62% of observed variance.
The differences in the manual DGs are statistically highly significant, always at the 0.005
level surviving the Bonferroni correction.
Result 1 (Basic adequacy). Focal captures manual choice of numbers effectively, explain-
ing 88% of the observed variance. All models capture graphical choice equally well.
A drop of R2 by 20 percentage points, from 89% to 69% as in AM02 and HJ06,
or even from 83% to 35% as in CHST07, is substantial. In this sense, the benchmark
models do not fit behavior “reasonably” well, and Figure 2 illustrates this by plotting the
models’ predictions in reasonably representative treatments (a full list of plots is provided
in the supplementary material). The main observation is that the benchmark models do not
come close to capturing the highly discontinuous distribution of manually chosen numbers.
18







B = 60,r = 1 : 2































0 2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59


























0 2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59

























0 2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59



























0 2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59



























B = 60,r = 1 : 2





























0 2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59




























0 2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59


























0 2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59























0 2 4 6 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32 35 38 41 44 47 50 53 56 59


























B = 600,r = 1 : 1































0 24 52 80 112 148 184 220 256 292 328 364 400 436 472 508 544 580




























0 24 52 80 112 148 184 220 256 292 328 364 400 436 472 508 544 580
























0 24 52 80 112 148 184 220 256 292 328 364 400 436 472 508 544 580
























0 24 52 80 112 148 184 220 256 292 328 364 400 436 472 508 544 580



























Note: These plots depict the “predictions” of various models in the respective treatments after fitting the model param-
eters to all treatments from the respective experiments. The plots shown here represent a fairly representative selection,
and the full list of plots is provided as supplementary material (as are the underlying parameter estimates). FKM07 is
left out here, as Treatments as such are not defined (budget sets and transfer rates are individually randomized) and the
differences between models are very minor in any case.
The reasons vary, but at least with hindsight they are clear14, even the markedness of
logit’s inadequacy of capturing choice, which renders the popularity of logit all the more
puzzling. Apparently, looking at data through the lens of logit (or similar models) yields a
very “blurry” representation of behavior and can hardly yield useful utility estimates.
The in-sample results are intuitive also in other respects. First, Focal attains a sub-
stantially higher pseudo-R2 in manual DGs than in graphical ones. This is intuitive, as
the round-number pattern implies that choices cover relatively few options in manual DGs
and thus indeed are more predictable than in graphical DGs. Second, the other models
are equally adequate in the (large) experiments with and without round-number effects
(AM02 and HJ06 vs. FKM07), confirming the optical impression that they do not com-
prehend round-number effects. Third, Focal’s adequacy is largely similar in the large and
small manual experiments, being 89% and 83%, respectively. These experiments differ in
the relative strength of round-number effects: CHST07 implements the largest number of
options, up to B = 1600, but the smallest number of different options actually gets cho-
sen by the subjects (see also the discussion of entropy following shortly). In this sense,
the round-number effects are strongest in CHST07, and the observation that Focal’s ade-
14Utilities are continuous by assumption, which implies that logit’s probabilities must be continuous.
OGEV, while being devised as a general model of choosing from ordered option sets, primarily captures
spikes at utility maximizers, most prominently zero transfers and Leontief transfers, which misrepresents
that spikes actually relate to round numbers. Limited attention improves on logit in the “right” direction,
being based on the focality index φ also used for Focal, but the effect is hardly visible. Round-number effects
are much stronger than limited attention admits, and its limitation seems related to its axiom “Hazard Rate
IIA” (Echenique et al., 2014), or “I-Asymmetry” and “I-Independence” in Manzini and Mariotti (2014).
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Table 5: Is entropy reliably captured?
Empirical Focal OGEV PALM Logit
All manual DGs 1.99 2.48∗ ≪ 3.58∗∗ ≈ 3.61∗∗ ≈ 3.63∗∗
AM02 + HJ06 2.1 2.53 < 3.27∗∗ ≈ 3.29∗∗ ≈ 3.32∗∗
CHST07 1.65 2.34 < 4.51∗∗ ≈ 4.57∗∗ ≈ 4.58∗∗
Content: This table relates the empirical entropy (estimated entropy averaged across all treatments in the
respective experiments) to the respective predictions of the four choice models. The results are either
pooled across all manual DG experiments or reported for the large/small DG experiments (AM02 + HJ06 or
CHST07, resp.). Differences are evaluated by Wilcoxon tests, the notation of relation signs is as in Table 4.
The “stars” indicate that the model’s prediction differ significantly from the empirical estimate; significance
at 0.005 is indicated by ∗∗ and significance at 0.05 is indicated by ∗.
quacy is similar in both types of experiments indicates that it captures the round-number
effect comprehensively. In turn, the adequacy of the other models drops substantially in
CHST07, to around 35%, confirming that these models do not comprehend round-numbers
effect: the stronger the round-number effect, the lower their adequacy. Finally, OGEV re-
laxes IIA and turns out to fit only slightly better than logit, which confirms the above
hypothesis that similarity effects are of minor relevance in Dictator experiments.
Explaining entropy The most focal phenomenon related to round-number effects is the
relatively low number of different options being chosen. This can be measured by estimat-
ing the entropy of the choice distribution. Using Pr(x) as the relative frequency of x, the
Shannon-entropy H =−∑x:Pr(x)6=0 Pr(x) log(Pr(x)) measures the information contained in
a set of observations, and exp(H) quantifies the number of different options being cho-
sen. To provide intuition, exp(H) is exactly 1 if all subjects choose the same option, it
is equal to the number of options if the observations are distributed uniformly, and in the
analyzed experiments, exp(H) is approximately equal to the number of different options
that are (minimally) required to cover 90% of all choices. The estimates of exp(H) are
around 5–10 in the manual DG experiments AM02, HJ06, CHST07, and around 30 in the
graphical DG of FKM07.15 Thus, subjects consistently focus on 5–10 options in manual
DGs, although the total number of options ranges from 41 to 1601.
To evaluate whether choice is captured in this respect, I use the estimates obtained
above and compute the predicted entropy in the various treatments. The significance of
differences between predicted and observed entropies is evaluated in Wilcoxon matched
pairs tests. The results are reported in Table 5 and confirm that both limited attention
(PALM) and Ordered GEV slightly improve on logit in capturing the observed choice
patterns, but are far from being compatible with the extent of the round-number effects.
In turn, Focal is compatible with it in the sense that the predicted entropy, while being
slightly too large,16 is not significantly different from the observed entropy.
15Detailed overviews of these statistics are provided in the supplementary material. To compute these
numbers for FKM07 (where budget sets are random between subjects), choices xi are transformed to shares
transfered, i.e. xi/maxx, for each decision and rounded to multiples of 0.01.
16Intuitively, this relates to the noise in the data, which is unpredictable ex-ante but manifests as specific
choices ex-post, and suggests that the assumed linear focality index may be improved upon.
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Table 6: Mean degrees of altruism α and efficiency concerns β
Focal OGEV PALM Logit
α β α β α β α β
AM02 0.08 0.17 -0.13 -0.16 -0.27 0.25 -0.07 -1.69
HJ06 0.23 -0.67 0.13 -0.6 0.17 -0.65 0.17 -0.65
FKM07 0.02 0.26 0.15 -0.17 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.24
CHST07 0.16 -0.14 0.5 -0.62 0.5 -0.62 0.5 -0.62
Content: This table reports the estimated means of the degree of altruism (α) and the degree of efficiency
concerns (β). The estimates are given for each choice model (Logit, OGEV, PALM, Focal) and each data
set. The estimated standard errors are mostly rather close to zero and skipped for readability of this table.
The are reported in the tables toward the end of the supplementary material.
Result 2. Focal captures the entropies of round-number choice across treatments.
Finally, Table 6 provides the estimated mean degrees of altruism and efficiency con-
cerns, i.e. the means of the distributions estimated for α and β across subjects. The mean
degree of efficiency concerns (β) is similar across models and data sets, being close to
zero (i.e. Cobb-Douglas). The mean degree of altruism varies substantially across data
sets, however. The estimates of logit, PALM and OGEV range from roughly −0.1 to
0.5, which is volatile given the general bounds of −0.5 and 0.5. The extreme estimates
are obtained in the experiments with the most pronounced round-number effects (i.e. with
the lowest entropy), −0.1 in AM02 and 0.5 in CHST07. This shows that round-number
effects do not simply bias estimates downwards or upwards. Their implications depend
on the relation of round numbers to theoretically prominent choices such as Leontief. In
contrast, Focal’s estimates are fairly robust, ranging from 0.02 to 0.23. We next analyze
whether these differences are significant and obstruct counterfactual predictions.17
5.2 Counterfactual predictions
Counterfactual predictions are a key component in applied work, as they are required for
policy recommendations (on say tax rates) and to obtain ex-ante hypotheses for experi-
ments. The following analysis will acknowledge that, when making predictions, we might
have more or less information about the target environment. We might know “choice pre-
cision” of the group to be predicted (i.e. the distribution of λ), the “choice bias” associated
with the interface used (distribution of κ), or nothing at all. To reflect these possibilities,
and as robustness checks, I distinguish counterfactual reliability to three degrees. The first
degree is the reliability of predicting preferences (mean and variance of α and β), while
precision and choice bias (mean and variance of λ and κ) are known for the target environ-
ment. This evaluates the predictiveness of preference estimates in isolation. The second
degree is the reliability of predicting both preferences and precision (mean and variance
17The full lists of parameter estimates, with robust standard errors, are provided in the supplementary
material. Standard errors are skipped in Table 6, as they are not informative to evaluate significance of
differences. It requires the joint evaluation of differences in four preference parameters and to control for
both precision λ and choice bias κ. These concerns are addressed in likelihood ratio tests as described next,
and as before, I use the robust LR test of Schennach and Wilhelm (2016).
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Table 7: Counterfactual reliability of estimates (pseudo-R2: more is better)
Limited
Value range Focality Similarity Attention IIA
Clairvoyance Naiveté (Focal) (OGEV) (PALM) (Logit)
First degree (Prediction of preferences)
Large manual 1 0 0.846 ≫ 0.522 ≫ 0.486 ≫ 0.443
Small manual 1 0 0.798 ≫ 0.226 ≈ 0.194 ≈ 0.179
Graphical 1 0 0.587 ≫ 0.456 ≈ 0.413 ≈ 0.425
Second degree (Prediction of preferences and precision)
Large manual 1 0 0.85 ≫ 0.511 ≫ 0.486 ≫ 0.443
Small manual 1 0 0.786 ≫ 0.205 ≈ 0.182 ≈ 0.18
Graphical 1 0 0.58 ≫ 0.43 ≈ 0.4 ≈ 0.411
Third degree (Prediction of preferences, precision and choice bias)
Large manual 1 0 0.824 ≫ 0.49 ≫ 0.437 ≫ 0.394
Small manual 1 0 0.757 ≫ 0.205 ≈ 0.172 ≈ 0.184
Content: This table evaluates the accuracy of predicting behavior in either “large manual” experiments
(Dout = AM02, HJ06), “small manual” experiment (Dout = CHST07) or “graphical” experiment (Dout =
FKM07), using estimates from the respective other studies. The pseudo-R2 are reported and relation signs
indicate results of Schennach-Wilhelm likelihood ratio tests: ≈ indicates p-values above 0.05, >,< indicate
p-values between 0.005 and 0.05, and ≫,≪ indicate p-values below 0.005.
of α,β,λ), while choice bias is assumed to be known, and the third degree requires out-of-
sample prediction of all parameters (mean and variance of α,β,λ,κ).
As counterfactuals, I use results from other experiments. That is, I take estimates
from a given experiments, predict observations in any other experiment, and rotate such
that each experiment is predicted based on estimates from any other experiment. Coun-
terfactual reliability to the third degree entails prediction of choice bias κ, i.e. predicting
the extent of round-number effects, which is not meaningful between manual and graph-
ical experiments. There I focus on predictions between the manual experiments. In the
following, I focus on reporting the pseudo-R2, i.e. observed variance captured by the pre-
dictions, which is proportional to the BICs but numerically easier to interpret. The classes
of experiments are labeled as above, large manual, small manual, and graphical.
Table 7 presents the results. The adequacy of the models for predictions is very
similar to their adequacy in capturing behavior in-sample, but the differences between
models increase. Predicting manual choice, Focal maintains 85% accuracy, while the
accuracy of the benchmark models drops to 40%–50%. This shows that Focal’s in-sample
accuracy is not an artefact of overfitting—if anything, the other models had been overfit.
The differences in predicting graphical choice are even more informative about the quality
of parameter estimates. Graphical choice does not exhibit round-number effects and all
models are equally adequate in-sample. Hence, all differences in predictions stem from
inaccurate measurement of preferences in the original data sets. The substantially higher
adequacy of Focal in predicting graphical choice, more than 10 percentage points out-of-
sample where the difference was zero in-sample, clearly shows that Focal provides more
accurate preference measurement and predictions.
Result 3. Focal’s counterfactual predictions are highly reliable, maintaining almost in-
sample accuracy in both cases, graphical and manual choice entry, and robustly even if
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Table 8: Estimate consistency across experiments (differences in BIC in-sample and out-
of-sample: less is better)
Limited
Value range Focality Similarity Attention IIA
Clairvoyance Naiveté (Focal) (OGEV) (PALM) (Logit)
First degree (Consistency of preferences)
Large manual 0 22737.7 531.4 ≪ 1601.6∗ < 2188.6∗∗ > 1655∗
Small manual 0 12910.4 1377.9∗ ≪ 7111∗∗ ≪ 8738.5∗∗ ≈ 8890.6∗∗
Graphical 0 5606 137.4 ≪ 859.6∗∗ > 733.7∗∗ ≈ 730.4∗∗
Second degree (Consistency of preferences and precision)
Large manual 0 22737.7 854.9 ≪ 1825.5∗∗ < 2327.2∗∗ > 1755.7∗∗
Small manual 0 12910.4 1275.7∗ ≪ 8108.3∗∗ ≪ 9252.4∗∗ ≈ 9359.2∗∗
Graphical 0 5606 151.4 ≪ 908.3∗∗ ≫ 660.4∗∗ ≈ 686.7∗∗
Third degree (Consistency of preferences, precision and choice bias)
Large manual 0 6447 235.5∗ ≪ 806.3∗∗ ≈ 746∗∗ ≈ 703.3∗∗
Small manual 0 4765.1 667∗∗ ≪ 1692.2∗∗ ≪ 2262∗∗ ≈ 2307.5∗∗
Content: This table evaluates consistency of estimates from either “large manual” experiments (Din =
AM02, HJ06), “small manual” experiment (Din = CHST07) or “graphical” experiment (Din = FKM07),
in relation to estimates from the respective other studies. As before, ≈ indicates p-values above 0.05, >,<
indicate p-values between 0.005 and 0.05, and ≫,≪ indicate p-values below 0.005. Further, “stars” indi-
cate the significance of inconsistency; significance at 0.005 is indicated by ∗∗ and significance at 0.05 by ∗.
Note: The third degree does not involve predictions of the graphical experiment (FKM07). Thus, the num-
bers are not directly comparable to the other degrees.
we have to predict precision (λ) and choice bias (κ) of subjects in the target environment.
Predicting manual choice, Focal’s accuracy exceeds those of the benchmark models by at
least 30 percentage points, and even on their in-sample fit, Focal’s predictions improve by
15 percentage points. Predicting graphical choice, Focal improves on the benchmarks by
at least 10 percentage points, despite the absence of round-number effects.
Finally, the reliability of counterfactual predictions is robust to limiting the knowledge
about the target environment, i.e. when we move from degree 1 to degree 2 and degree 3.
The precision of subjects (degree 2) is predicted reliably, i.e. it represents a robust facet
of behavior, and Focal’s accuracy drops only slightly (between two and four percentage
points in the pseudo-R2) if we have to predict the extent of the choice bias κ in addition
(degree 3). In applications, neither precision nor choice bias therefore need to be known
for the target environment. This shows that even the extent of round-number effects, as
measured through Focal’s κ, is a robust facet of behavior in manual choice experiments.
5.3 Consistency of estimates
Now assume we have two data sets and wish to examine if preferences in one experiment
differ from those in the other one. To evaluate such “estimate consistency”, the relevant
likelihood ratio is the difference of log-likelihoods in-sample and out-of-sample. That is,
we take estimates from a data set D1, predict D2, and compare the resulting likelihood
to the one of the model when D2 was estimated in-sample. Consistency is violated if
the prediction fits significantly worse than the model had fit in-sample. Significance of
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consistency violation is tested again in the robust Schennach-Wilhelm test and indicated by
asterisks in Table 8: one asterisk indicates weakly significant inconsistency (p-value below
0.05) and two asterisks indicate significance of inconsistency robust to the Bonferroni
correction (p-value below 0.005). Similarly to above, I distinguish consistency to three
degrees, consistency of preference estimates in isolation, consistency of preference and
precision estimates jointly, and consistency of all estimates jointly, and also as above,
I aggregate results based on user interface. Table 8 additionally reports on the relative
consistency of the models, i.e. whether model estimates are significantly more or less
consistent than those of other models (via relation signs), which I discuss further below.
The results in Table 8 confirm the above impression that Focal’s predictions reach
in-sample accuracy in most cases. Controlling for the different numbers of parameters
in-sample and out-of-sample, the differences between in-sample and out-of-sample are
mostly insignificant, violating consistency at the Bonferroni level of 0.005 in only 1/8
cases. The estimates of logit, PALM and OGEV violate consistence at this level in 7/8
cases each. This is informative, as consistency is in principle independent of the in-sample
accuracy. For example, a model that does not fit well in-sample may still be particularly
robust due to being “simpler” (Hey et al., 2010), e.g. by making less or fewer inade-
quate assumptions or by being less flexible and thus avoiding overfitting. Focal achieves
both, capturing choice accurately in-sample as well as enabling reliable predictions out-
of-sample and consistent estimates across samples—strongly suggesting that it provides
an accurate description of choice across these standard experiments. This holds in par-
ticular in comparison with the benchmark models, as the relation signs in Table 8 show.
A model is called significantly “more consistent” than another model if its inconsistency
(difference out-of-sample and in-sample) is significantly lower than the inconsistencies of
the other models, evaluated again in Schennach-Wilhelm LR tests. A single relation sign
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, double relation signs indicate significance robust
to the Bonferroni correction (0.005). Universally across the three groups of experiments
and the three degrees of knowledge about the target environment, Focal’s estimates are
significantly more consistent than those of the other models at the robust 0.005 level.18
Result 4. Preference estimates obtained via Focal from large experiments (at least eight
observations per subject) do not significantly differ from those of other experiments, while
those obtained from the small experiment (CHST07, two observations per subject) differ at
least weakly significantly. The estimates obtained using the benchmark models generally
differ highly significantly between all experiments.
This shows that reliable preference measurement is possible, but it requires adequate
models and a sufficient number of observations per subject. The former is an economet-
ric concern, the latter is a concern about experimental design, and jointly they are to be
observed to reliably detect behavioral differences across games and studies. Experimen-
tal designs that vary conditions mostly or only between subjects do not allow to reliably
separate altruism (α), efficiency concerns (β) and precision (λ), implying that behavior
is weakly identified in each dimension. Relatedly, let me clarify that the subject pools
18In turn, there is no robust ranking between logit, PALM and OGEV with respect to their consistency.
Between these three models, every one of them is most consistent in one context and least consistent in
another context.
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are for our purposes identical: the counterfactual predictions (Table 7) show that estimates
from other experiments allow to predict behavior in CHST07 accurately, close to achieving
in-sample accuracy, but Table 8 shows that the estimates from CHST07 are not suitable
to predict behavior in the other experiments. This clearly attests weak identification as
opposed to differences between subject pools.
This observation corresponds also with the theoretical identification result. The key
to identification was that the mapping from options to utilities or options to focalities
varies across tasks, i.e. that utility and focality are not collinear, but that is not given in
CHST07: the experiment always uses 1:1 transfers and only extends the option sets. All
other experiments vary the transfer rates and thus change the mapping from options to
utilities across tasks. Notably, Focal is still the least vulnerable model, but within-subject
variation in choice tasks seems necessary to reliably disentangle preferences and noise,
i.e. to detect behavioral differences across classes of games.
5.4 Comparative relevance
The relevance of controlling for heterogeneity in preference estimation is widely recog-
nized. I use this observation to benchmark the relevance of controlling for presentation.
Table 9 provides Bayes Information Criteria and pseudo-R2 similar to above, but now as a
function of the extent of subject heterogeneity being controlled for. The analysis focuses
on logit and Focal, of which logit does not control for presentation effects while Focal
by construction does so (the other benchmark models are very similar to logit, see above,
and therefore skipped here). First, let us focus on the relevance in-sample, Table 9a. The
“homogeneous logit” model neglects both subject heterogeneity and focality and captures
21.2% of observed variation. Controlling for heterogeneity allows to explain an additional
38% of observed variance, corroborating the intuition that controlling for heterogeneity is
critical. Controlling for focality has the same impact in-sample, requiring only one addi-
tional parameter (κ) instead of four (variances of α,β,λ,κ to capture heterogeneity), and if
applied in addition to controlling for heterogeneity, it still improves the R2 by 30 percent-
age points. In-sample, that is, controlling for focality and controlling for heterogeneity are
similarly important and almost perfectly complementary.
Tables 9b and 9c analyze reliability out-of-sample, and in particular, they analyze
the reliability of the preference and precision estimates when making counterfactual pre-
dictions (degrees 1 and 2). The reliability of preference estimates (Table 9b) improves by
around 49 percentage points in terms of R2 by controlling for heterogeneity, and by another
43 percentage points on top controlling for focality. When predicting both preferences and
precision in other experiments, the distributions of (α,β,λ) across subjects, controlling for
heterogeneity improves upon the homogeneous logit model by 45 percentage points and
controlling for focality adds another 44 percentage points on top of it (Table 9c).
Result 5. Controlling for focality and controlling for heterogeneity are of similar rele-
vance, highly complementary and both necessary in reliable preference measurement.
The mixed logit model with full heterogeneity explains 59.8% percent of observed
variance in sample, and it explains 40.1% out-of-sample; controlling for focality, the R2 is
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Table 9: Relevance of controlling for round-number effects in preference estimation, in
relation to controlling for subject heterogeneity
(a) Accuracy in-sample (upper panel: BIC, lower panel: Pseudo-R2; both, less is better)
Clairvoyance Naiveté Repr Agent Het Prefs Het Pref & Prec Full Het
Logit 3558.9 9408.4 8166.6 ≫ 6365.3 ≫ 5622.3 ≈ 5621.4
Focal 3558.9 9408.4 5878.2 ≫ 3940.8 > 3809.8 ≈ 3802.3
Logit 0.212 ≪ 0.48 ≪ 0.598 ≈ 0.598
Focal 0.603 ≪ 0.863 < 0.884 ≈ 0.885
(b) Out-of-sample degree 1: Reliability of preference estimates (upper panel: BIC, lower panel: Pseudo-R2)
Clairvoyance Naiveté Repr Agent Het Prefs Het Pref & Prec Full Het
Logit 3558.9 9408.4 9940.9 ≫ 6546.9 ≪ 6879.4 ≈ 6870.5
Focal 3558.9 9408.4 6108.8 ≫ 4733.2 ≫ 4096.5 ≈ 4097.1
Logit -0.091 ≪ 0.452 ≫ 0.399 ≈ 0.401
Focal 0.564 ≪ 0.738 ≪ 0.838 ≈ 0.838
(c) Out-of-sample degree 2: Reliability of preference and precision estimates jointly (top: BIC, bottom: Pseudo-R2)
Clairvoyance Naiveté Repr Agent Het Prefs Het Pref & Prec Full Het
Logit 3558.9 9408.4 9689.8 ≫ 6902.8 ≈ 6887.8 ≈ 6866.5
Focal 3558.9 9408.4 7886.5 ≫ 4486.7 ≫ 4098.2 ≈ 4085.9
Logit -0.048 ≪ 0.395 ≈ 0.398 ≈ 0.401
Focal 0.26 ≪ 0.777 ≪ 0.838 ≈ 0.84
Note: Each panel provides BIC and pseudo-R2 for overall 4×2 models: four models of subject heterogeneity
(starting with the “representative agent” model, i.e. homogeneity) and two models of choice (the status quo
logit, and the generalization Focal). The underlying likelihood ratio tests follow Schennach and Wilhelm
(2016), >,< indicate p-values between 0.005 and 0.05, and ≫,≪ indicate p-values below 0.005.
at a much higher level in-sample and drops substantially less out-of-sample, from 88.5%
to 84%—showing that the reliability of estimates indeed improves. In contrast, the esti-
mates of the logit model assuming homogeneity of subjects actually have negative exter-
nal validity (−9.1% and −4.8% and Tables 9b and 9c), implying that representative-agent
predictions provide at best uninformed guesses. This holds true whether or not we control
for stochastic choice, and with hindsight, this is fairly obvious: The comparative stat-
ics depend on presentation, and if we calibrate a representative agent based on one set
of observations, then the predictions for the other sets simply cannot be correct without
controlling for representation. Since representative agent models are frequently used to
theoretically predict behavior for policy recommendations and experimental hypotheses,
this is a substantial concern and shows us that falsifying such predictions is not necessarily
informative about the underlying model. The basic model used here, CES altruism, is fine,
but the representative agent prediction neglecting presentation simply is inadequate.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops and applies a general framework allowing to capture presentation
effects in stochastic choice. The point of departure is Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2001) repre-
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sentation of set-based preferences, which captures the general notion that choice itself can
be a non-trivial task and decision makers can be distracted (or “tempted”) by suboptimal
options. Their representation result is translated into invariance conditions about choice
probabilities, augmented by the positivity axiom, and then solved to obtain a representa-
tion of stochastic choice allowing for distractions due to (e.g.) the focality of options. The
model is tested by re-analyzing standard laboratory experiments on dictator games, and
the results confirm the impression of the introductory examples. Choice patterns and com-
parative statics strongly depend on presentation, see Figure 1—and inadvertently, coun-
terfactual predictions and utility analyses neglecting presentation are unreliable (Results 3
and 4). This implies that falsifying predictions or detecting behavioral differences between
games without controlling for presentation risks being uninformative, if not misleading.
The idea that presentation of choice tasks affects choice seems widely recognized,
as a number of reasons for presentation effects such as ordering, round-number, and left-
digit effects are well-documented. Considering this, surprisingly few studies explicitly
analyze presentation effects in choice, and the few examples I am aware of, e.g. Bernheim
and Rangel (2007) and Salant and Rubinstein (2008), all focus on rational (non-stochastic)
choice. This paper contributes to this literature by showing the high relevance, comparable
to controlling for heterogeneity, and the possibility of rigorously modeling presentation
effects allowing for stochastic choice, in both theoretical and experimental analyses.
The econometric results explicitly show that we can (and need to) factor in presenta-
tion when making predictions about experiments or policy interventions (Results 3 and 5)
and that we can control for presentation effects when evaluating model adequacy across
experiments (Result 4). In order to enable the latter, i.e. to identify models allowing for
presentation and heterogeneity, we require within-subject variations of choice tasks (Re-
sult 4), namely to disentangle between-subject variation due to preference heterogeneity,
within-subject variation due to noise, and within-subject variation due to presentation.
Without such designs, inference is unreliable and convergence of preference model-
ing is not attainable, simply due to the presentational differences between experiments.
To give an idea about the magnitude of these differences, the designs used in analyses of
dictator games range from experiments with two or three options to choose from (Char-
ness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) over experiments offering around 10
options (List, 2007; Dana et al., 2006) to experiments offering up to a hundred (Andreoni
and Miller, 2002; Harrison and Johnson, 2006) or even a thousand of options (Fisman
et al., 2007; Cappelen et al., 2007). Dictator experiments further range from allowing
the equal split to result from choosing a round number to ruling out that the equal split
is attainable at all, and from classroom experiments conducted with paper and pencil to
computerized experiments allowing for graphical user interfaces or assistance in comput-
ing payoff profiles—and this is just the comparably small class of dictator games. Such
differences are traditionally labeled “strategically irrelevant”, but as shown above, they are
choice relevant and substantially confound utility analyses. This confounds understand-
ing behavior in dictator games and thus understanding differences to other games such as
taking (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008) and sorting games (Dana et al., 2006; Lazear et al.,
2012), which in turn suggests that behavioral analyses may perpetually disagree unless we
acknowledge presentation the way we acknowledge heterogeneity and stochastic choice.
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Regarding implications for future work, in addition to allowing for within-subject
variation of choice tasks, a few more points appear worth noting. First, the above analysis
assumed that the relative focality of options is linear in the “level of roundedness” observed
in statistical analysis of survey responses. This can be generalized straightforwardly, but
linearity seems sufficient when analyzing dictator choice. Secondly, the existing exper-
imental literature recognizes potential ordering effects in choice from lists and routinely
reverses the ordering to nullify such effects. As discussed in Rubinstein and Salant (2006),
the extreme options in lists may well have relatively high or relatively low focality, imply-
ing that order reversals are insufficient. An alternative approach implied by Theorem 2 is
to arrange the options along a circle, which can be rotated, and the resulting equation sys-
tem (see Section 3.3) identifies utility and focality up to affine transformation (Lemma 1
in the appendix). Finally, in two of the experiments considered here, the payoff-equalizing
“Leontief” choices had been round numbers in all tasks (AM02 and CHST07), and these
two experiments happened to yield estimates of utility parameters deviating the most from
the graphical choice benchmark FKM07. It thus seems advisable to vary the roundedness
of predictions associated with particular models (as in HJ06). Alternatively, the graphical
interface of FKM07 mitigates round-number effects, but this “number free” choice elici-
tation is not applicable in experiments on strategic choice and difficult to use outside the
laboratory, implying that presentation cannot be circumvented this way in general.
To conclude, there obviously are many open questions regarding presentation effects
and their analysis. Given the possibility to study these effects theoretically and economet-
rically, as shown here, it seems possible to capture a wide range of such “choice distrac-
tions” in a rigorous and reliable manner. This is necessary yet also promising to advance
our understanding of preferences across games, and hence warrants consideration and in-
vestigation in future work.
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A For online publication: Proofs and technical definitions
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Any choice profile Pr with a Focal representation satisfies Axioms 1–5, as can be verified
easily. I focus on establishing ⇒, showing that Axioms 1–5 imply that the choice profile
has a Focal representation for some λ,κ ∈ R. As in the paper, I write ux = u(x) and φx =
φ(x) for all x ∈ X . I say that ux is interior if there exist x′,x′′ ∈ X such that ux′ < ux < ux′′ .








for all x ∈ B ∈ P(X).














:=Pr(x|u,φ,{x,y})/Pr(y|u,φ,{x,y}). The argument, using solely
IIA, is well-known, see e.g. McFadden (1974, p. 109). Eq. (7) holds true for all x,y ∈ B
and all B ∈ P(X), i.e. for all y ∈ X . Hence, the odds of choosing x over x′ are constant for





V (ux′ ,uy,φx′ ,φy,x′,y)
=
V (ux,uy′ ,φx,φy′ ,x,y
′)
V (ux′ ,uy′ ,φx′ ,φy′ ,x′,y′)
for all x,x′,y,y′ ∈ B and all B ∈ P(X). This ratio is therefore independent of y, and by
convexity of X in R (richness) this implies that the derivate of the ratio with respect to any




V (ux′ ,uy,φx′ ,φy,x′,y)
= 0.
As a result, functions f (y,uy,φy) and V1(x,ux,φx) exist such that V (ux,uy,φx,φy,x,y) =
V1(x,ux,φx) · f (y,uy,φy) for all x,y ∈ X , and we can write, for all B ∈ P(X), x ∈ B and
y ∈ X ,
Pr(x|u,φ,B) =
V (ux,uy,φx,φy,x,y)







Finally, “completeness” implies that for any x,x′ such that ux = ux′ and φx = φx′ , V1(x,ux,φx)=
V1(x
′,ux′ ,φx′), which implies that the argument x can be dropped in the sense that there ex-
ists a function Vu,φ : R2 → R such that Vu,φ(ux,φx) =V1(x,ux,φx) for all x ∈ X .
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Step 2: Vu,φ(ux,φx) = exp{λ ux +κ φx + cx} for all (u,φ) ∈ C and all x ∈ X .
By positivity, for any (u,φ) ∈ C , either Vu,φ(ux,φx) > 0 for all x or Vu,φ(ux,φx) < 0 for all
x. Without loss of generality, assume Vu,φ(ux,φx)> 0 for all x (otherwise, multiply Vu,φ by
−1). By narrow bracketing and relative focality,
Vu+ru,φ+rφ(ux + ru,φx + rφ)











for all (u,φ)∈ C , all (ru,rφ)∈R2 and all x,x′ ∈ X . Further, by “completeness”, there exists
a function h : R2 → R such that, for all (u,φ) ∈ C , and all (ru,rφ) ∈ R2,
Vu+ru,φ+rφ(ux + ru,φx + rφ)
Vu+ru,φ+rφ(ux′ + ru,φx′ + rφ)
=
h(ux + ru,φx + rφ)
h(ux′ + ru,φx′ + rφ)
for all x,x′ ∈ X .
Combined, by positivity of V , there exists a function g : R2 → R such that
h(ux + ru,φx + rφ) =Vu,φ(ux,φx) ·g(ru,rφ) = h(ux,φx) ·g(ru,rφ),
for all (u,φ) ∈ C , (ru,rφ) ∈ R2, and x ∈ X . By richness of choice tasks, for any (p1, p2) ∈
R
2, there exist (u,φ) ∈ C and x ∈ X such that p1 = ux and p2 = φx. Hence, the previous
functional equation holds for all points in R2,
h(p1 + ru, p2 + rφ) = h(p1, p2) ·g(ru,rφ) for all (p1, p2),(ru,rφ) ∈ R
2,
By positivity, h,g > 0 implies that h̃ = logh and g̃ = logg are well-defined, which yields
h̃(p1 + ru, p2 + rφ) = h̃(p1, p2)+ g̃(ru,rφ) for all (p1, p2),(ru,rφ) ∈ R
2. (9)
This is an instance of the fundamental Pexider functional equation in R2. Next, holding







for all x ∈ X , it follows that s ∈ R exists such that Pr(x|u,φ,{x,y}) =Vu,φ(ux,φx) · s for all
x ∈ X . By positivity, s > 0. Now, Pr(x|u,φ,{x,y})≤ 1 for all x implies Vu,φ(ux,φx)≤ 1/s
for all x ∈ X and therefore h(ux,φx)≤ log1/s for all x ∈ X . Since the images u[X ],φ[X ] are
convex, non-singleton subsets of R, this implies that h is bounded from above on intervals
of positive length (in each dimension, ux and φx). Thus Theorem 9 (page 43) and Theorem
8 (page 17) in Aczél and Dhombres (1989) jointly imply that all solutions of the functional
equation (9) satisfy
h̃(ux,φx) = λux +κφx + cx for all x ∈ X ,(u,φ) ∈ C ,
for some λ,κ ∈ R and c : X → R. The parameters λ,κ ∈ R and c : X → R are unique, as
the images of u and φ are not collinear. Since Eq. (8) holds for all x,x′, the weights λ and
κ are independent of x, while c may be an arbitrary function c : X →R; also by Eq. (8), all
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these terms are independent of (u,φ). Thus, we obtain, using Vu,φ = exp h̃,
Vu,φ(ux,φx) = exp{λux +κφx + cx} for all x ∈ X ,(u,φ) ∈ C . (10)
Step 3: Vu,φ(ux,φx) = exp{λ ux +κ φx}.
For contradiction, assume the opposite, i.e. Eq. (10) and Axiom 5 are satisfied, but choice
probabilities are not Focal, i.e. cx 6= const. Fix x,y ∈ X such that cx 6= cy, B = {x,y}, a
context (u,φ) ∈ C , and construct the “inverted” context (u′,φ′) such that
ux = u
′
y, uy = u
′
x, φx = φ
′
y, φy = φ
′
x.








exp{λ ·ux +κ ·φx + cx}
exp{λ ·uy +κ ·φy + cy}
=
exp{λ ·u′y +κ ·φ
′
y + cy}




exp{λ ·ux +κ ·φx + cy}
exp{λ ·uy +κ ·φy + cx}
⇔ cx − cy = cy − cx (12)
which implies cx = cy, the contradiction. Hence, cx is const in x, implying that c cancels
out, establishing ⇒.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Fix (u,φ) ∈ C . If Pr has a Focal representation, we know from vx := logPr(x|X) that, for














∑x′∈B exp{λux′ +κφx′ +a(x′)}
.












for all x,x′ ∈ X ,
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implying a(x)/a(x′) = 1 for all x,x′ ∈ X . Thus, there exists a ∈ R such that vx = λux +
κφx + a for all x. Now, to characterize a, define a sequence (xε) such that limε→0 vxε =
infx vx, which implies limε→0(λuxε +κφxε) = infx(λux +κφx) as a is constant. Since
Pr(x|u,φ,B) =
exp{vx − infv}
∑x′∈B exp{vx′ − infv}
=
exp{λux +κφx − r}
∑x′∈B exp{λux′ +κφx′ − r)}
,











for all x ∈ X . Hence, vx − a1 = λux + κφx − a2, for all x ∈ X and (u,φ) ∈ C , implying
a = a1 − a2 ≡ infx vx − infx(λux + κφx) as claimed. Lemma 1 shows that this implies
identification of u and φ up to affine transformation from two adequate tasks.
A.3 Additional results clarifying identification
The results in this subsection are the basis of the discussion of identification in Section 3.3.
Lemma 1 shows that both u and φ are identified (up to affine transformation) if we rotate
options, implying that they indeed can be seen as distinct choice factors, and Lemma 2
shows that identification is not possible if we simply reverse the order of options.
Lemma 1. Fix B ∈ P(X) and any context (u,φ). Define a second context by rotating u
toward ũ such that
ũ(x) = u(x−1) for all x > minB and ũ(maxB) = u(minB).
Observations from the two contexts (u,φ) and (ũ,φ) suffice to identify (u,φ) up to affine
transformation.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume B = {1,2, . . . ,10}. By Theorem 2, based on the
choice probabilities observing in (u,φ) and (ũ,φ), we obtain the equation system
v1 = a+λu1 +κφ1 (1a)
v2 = a+λu2 +κφ2 (2a)
...
v10 = a+λu10 +κφ10 (10a)
ṽ1 = ã+λu10 +κφ1 (1b)
ṽ2 = ã+λu1 +κφ2 (2b)
...
ṽ10 = ã+λu9 +κφ10, (10b)
where (vi) and (ṽi) are known and a, ã,λ,κ,(ui),(φi) are unknown. The claim is that both
(ui) and (φi) are defined up to affine transformation.
First, rearrange the equation system by defining equations (1c) = (1b)− (1a), (2c) =
(2b)− (2a) and so on, as well as equations (1d) = (1a)− (2b), (2d) = (2a)− (3b), and
so on. This yields the following system.
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v1 − ṽ1 = a− ã+λu1 −λu10 (1c)
v2 − ṽ2 = a− ã+λu2 −λu1 (2c)
...
v10 − ṽ10 = a− ã+λu10 −λu9 (10c)
v1 − ṽ2 = a− ã+λφ1 −λφ2 (1d)
v2 − ṽ3 = a− ã+λφ2 −λφ3 (2d)
...
v10 − ṽ1 = a− ã+λφ10 −λφ1 (10d)
Second, set φ1 = 0 and define equations (1e) = (1d), (2e) = (1d)+ (2d), (3e) = (2e)+
(3d), . . . , (10e) = (9e)+(10d), as well as constants d1 = v1 − ṽ2, d2 = v2 − ṽ3 and so on.
This yields
d1 = a− ã−λφ2 (1e)
d1 +d2 = 2(a− ã)−λφ3 (2e)
d1 +d2 +d3 = 3(a− ã)−λφ4 (3e)
... (13)
d1 + · · ·+d9 = 9(a− ã)−λφ10 (9e)
d1 + · · ·+d10 = 10(a− ã)−λφ1 (10e)
Given φ1 = 0, equation (10e) defines (a− ã), and using this, λφ2, . . . ,λφ10 are defined from
equations (1e)–(9e).
Finally, set u1 = 0, which implies that λu10 and λu2 are defined from equations (1c)
and (2c), since we know a− ã. Knowing λu2, equation (3c) identifies λu3, which implies
that (4c) identifies λu4 and so on, up to λu9 which is identified from (9c).
Lemma 2. Reversion of the order of options does not suffice for identification. That is,
given the equation system
v1 = a+λu1 +κφ1 (1a)
v2 = a+λu2 +κφ2 (2a)
...
v10 = a+λu10 +κφ10 (10a)
ṽ1 = ã+λu10 +κφ1 (1b)
ṽ2 = ã+λu9 +κφ2 (2b)
...
ṽ10 = ã+λu1 +κφ10, (10b)
where (vi) and (ṽi) are known and a, ã,λ,κ,(ui),(φi) are unknown, (ui) and (φi) are not
defined up to affine transformation.
Proof. For purpose of contradiction, assume (ui) and (φi) are defined up to affine transfor-
mation. Without loss of generality, assume u1 = 0 and φ1 = 0. Since u and φ are identified
up to affine transformation, this implies that λu j,κφ j are uniquely identified by the above
equation system for all j = 2, . . . ,9. Now consider the equations
v2 = a+λu2 +κφ2 (2a)
v9 = a+λu9 +κφ9 (9a)
ṽ2 = ã+λu9 +κφ2 (2b)
ṽ9 = ã+λu2 +κφ9 (9b)
A-5
and assume that a and ã are known. Then, this represents a system of four equations
and four unknowns, (u2,u9,φ2,φ9), and these unknowns are not contained in any other
equation. Hence, they must be uniquely defined by these four equations. Note that these
equations are either linearly dependent, if (9b) = (2a)+ (9a)− (2b), or inconsistent, if
(9b) 6= (2a)+(9a)− (2b), the contradiction.
A.4 Modeling utility and subject heterogeneity








where α represents the degree of altruism and β the degree of efficiency concerns. The
standard assumption is that incomes πi,π j represent incomes measured in experimental
tokens. Alternatively, incomes may represent the monetary values underlying the experi-
mental tokens or utilities may be normalized to the range [0,1] as in (u− umin)/(umax −
umin). The latter has been proposed by Wilcox (2011), Padoa-Schioppa (2009), and Padoa-
Schioppa and Rustichini (2014) based on neuro-economic evidence that stimuli adapt to
the environment. Thus, the normalization may improve fit across treatments and across
experiments. The supplementary material analyzes which of these approaches captures
utility best. The differences in-sample are insignificant, and out-of-sample, token-based
utilities tend to fit best for logit and OGEV, while contextual utility tends to fit best for
PALM and Focal. The differences are fairly minor overall, but for clarity, the supple-
mentary material reports robustness checks on all results for all three approaches to utility
definition. The paper reports the results for the approach favoring the status quo (logit),
i.e. token-based utility.
Each subject is characterized by precision λ, altruism α, efficiency concerns β, and
choice bias κ. Subjects may be heterogeneous, i.e. all parameters may be distributed
randomly across subjects. Using p = (λ,κ,α,β) to describe the parameter profile of a
given subject and f (·|d) to describe its joint density in the population given distribution




f (p|d) ·Pr(os|p) d p, (15)
with Pr(os|p) as the probability that os results under parameter profile p given the utility
standardization and choice model being analyzed. The integral in Eq. (15) is evaluated by
simulation, using quasi random numbers following standard practice (Train, 2003). The
underlying distributional assumptions are as follows: altruism α is normal truncated to
the interval [−0.5,0.5], efficiency β is normal without truncation, precision λ and choice
κ are log-normal. In each case, both mean and variance are considered free parameters
of the model. Overall the models thus have (up to) eight free parameters, which is con-
servative in relation to regression models used in experimental analyses and in relation
to the more progressive structural models (Harrison et al., 2007; Bellemare et al., 2008).
Regardless, identifiability of the parameters is verified explicitly by analyzing reliability
and consistency across experiments.
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The supplementary material reports robustness checks investigating whether lower-
dimensional models are possibly as adequate in-sample but more reliably identified and
thus more robust out-of-sample. Heterogeneity of preferences is highly significant, as
known from the literature and as indicated in Table 9. Heterogeneity of precision is simi-
larly significant, both in-sample and out-of-sample. Heterogeneity of the choice bias κ is
not significant in-sample but it is significant out-of-sample, i.e. allowing for heterogeneity
of κ improves predictions for all “rich data sets” with at least eight observations per sub-
ject (AM02, HJ06, FKM07). In turn, identification is weak given the data from CHST07,
as shown in the supplement, i.e. the two observations per subject do not allow us to dis-
entangle preferences, precision and choice allowing for heterogeneity. For this reason, I
skip predictions based on CHST07 in the main analysis, which allows me to use the most
adequate model for the rich data sets allowing subjects to be heterogeneous in all four




with o= {os}s∈S. Parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood, sequentially
applying two maximization algorithms. Initially I use the robust, gradient-free NEWUOA
algorithm (Powell, 2006), and subsequently I verify convergence using a Newton-Raphson
algorithm. The estimates are tested by extensive cross-analysis to ensure that global max-
ima are found (as described in the supplementary material).
Models are discriminated by likelihood ratio tests that allow for both misspecified and
potentially nested models, following Schennach and Wilhelm (2016) and as described in
the supplement. Throughout the paper and the supplementary material, I indicate signif-
icance (p-values) at two levels, “weak significance” for p = 0.05 and “high significance”
for p = 0.005. The former standard level has limited relevance in most cases, due to
multiple testing problems resulting from testing several models on several data sets si-
multaneously. By analyzing multiple data sets in parallel, I avoid the reliance on a single
p-value, addressing the concerns of Wasserstein and Lazar (2016) and providing the gen-
eral picture, but to account for the multiple testing problem, significance at the stricter
level is generally focused on.
A.5 Benchmark models: Formal definitions





Limited attention Round-number effects can be interpreted two ways: subjects either
focus on some options or neglect other options. Masatlioglu et al. (2012) generalize re-
vealed preference to account for DMs not considering all their options, Manzini and Mari-
otti (2014) generalize this idea to stochastic choice, and Echenique et al. (2014) generalize
the model further by allowing for a weak “perception ordering”: first all options at the
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highest perception level are considered, second the options at the next-highest level, and
so on. This Perception Adjusted Luce Model (PALM) straightforwardly applies to focality
effects, first the most focal options are considered, next the second layer, and so on, and
hence it constitutes a natural benchmark for Focal. Formally, DM with utility u, focality
φ, precision λ, and choice bias κ ∈ [0,1], chooses x ∈ B with








where µ(x,X) = Logit(x) = exp{λ ux}/∑x′∈X exp{λ ux′}. The focality index φ used here
will (of course) be equivalent in Focal. While Echenique et al. define and axiomatize
PALM only for κ = 1, I allow for the whole spectrum down to κ = 0 (which is logit).
Further, I rescale the choice probabilities so they add up to 1, following Manzini and
Mariotti’s suggestion for cases without “outside options”.
Similarity/Nested logit Choice violates IIA in the presence of “similarity” effects, and
intuitively proximate numbers are more similar than distant numbers. Such similarity ef-
fects can be expressed by nested logit (McFadden, 1976) where DM first chooses a “nest”
of options and secondly makes his final choice from this nest. Small (1987) introduces
a cross-nested logit model (with overlapping nests) for choice from ordered sets, called
Ordered GEV,19 which intuitively captures possible similarity effects in manual choice.
Here, DM first makes a tentative choice y ∈ B and then reconsiders the neighborhood of y
to make the final choice x ∈ [y−w,y+w]. To clarify the relevance of nesting and similarity
effects, I include Ordered GEV as benchmark model. Formally, DM with utility u, preci-
sion λ, degree of correlation κ, bandwidth parameter M < |X |, and options represented by




















19All cross-nested logit models are compatible with random utility if utility perturbations have a general-
ized extreme value distribution (GEV), hence the name Ordered GEV.
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